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Review and comments to the paper by Bélyácz – Daubner1
Zoltán Zéman2
ABSTRACT
The authors published their paper in the previous issue of this journal under the 
title ’Logical probability, uncertainty, investment decisions’ and with the subtitle 
in brackets ’Did Keynes’ logical theory of probability have impact on economic 
thinking?’. 
Both the title and the subtitle of the paper indicate the authors’ intention to find 
out if Keynes’ theory of logical probability had an impact on economic thinking 
in general. Note that acccording to the Abstract, the authors of the paper also 
wanted to find out whether or not Keynes’ theory of logical probability had an 
impact on his own economic thinking.3 The authors review several theories and 
analyse their correlations as well as Keynes’ impact on modern economics. 
JEL codes: B22, B220
Keywords: keynesian, macroeconomics, neo-keynesian, neoclassicism
1 Bélyácz, Iván – Daubner, Katalin (2020): Logical Probability, Uncertainty, Investment Deci-
sions. Did Keynes’s logical theory of probability have impact on economic thinking? Economy and 
Finance 7(1), 2–46.
2 Zéman, Zoltán, University Professor and Head of Institute at the University „Szent István”, Fac-
ulty of Economics and Social Sciences, Institute of Business Studies. E-mail: zeman.zoltan@gtk.
szie.hu.
3 British mathematician and economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was maybe the best 
known monetary representative of modern macroeconomy. In his main work, published in 1936, 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, GT he argued for the division of eco-
nomics into two independent parts, which took place after his death. Their names today are mac-
roeconomy and microeconomy. The economic approach he established is called Keynesianism. 
Keynes was also one of the founders of the system of logical probability.
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1  COMMENTS ON THE FINDINGS OF THE PAPER  
WITH SHORT EXTRACTS
1.1 The Introduction
The authors’ starting point is that despite four centuries of research and the ac-
ceptance of formalised axiomatic systems by many, there is no consensus regard-
ing the economic connotations of probability. Hacking expressed his doubts writ-
ing in 1975 that none of the numerous interpretations emerging through the ages 
could settle the debate on what actually probability is. 
First, the authors discuss the different approaches to probability in depth includ-
ing the classical, the frequency and the logical approach, the subjective interpreta-
tion, the subjectivist probabilities, the propensity interpretation and all the theories 
and criticism of the above. They discuss the division of probability intepretations 
epistemologically and ontologically, into inductive and objective versions. 
They advise that the foundation of Keynes’ subsequent views were laid down in 
his Treatise on Probability (TP) published in 1921, in which he declared, “There 
appear to be four alternatives:
1) Either in some cases there is no probability at all; or
2) probabilities do not all belong to a single set of magnitudes measurable in terms 
of a common unit; or
3) these measures always exist, but in many cases are, and must remain, un-
known; or
4) probabilities do belong to such a set and their measures are capable of being 
determined by us, although we are not always able so to determine them in 
practice”.
The authors call attention that in his work The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money (GT) published in 1936 Keynes broke away from the partial 
equilibrium analysis-based approach of classical economics. In the main his the-
ory can be regarded as an aggregated general equilibrium framework centred on 
uncertainty. Keynes wrote The General Theory of Employment (GTE) published in 
1937 with the purpose of summarising what the GT had to say and putting forward 
an even more convincing argument for its claims. In these two papers Keynes 
expresses his view that the performance of the economy as a whole is mainly de-
termined by the volume of investment. He considered the quantity of investment 
to be the factor defining “the level of output and employment as a whole”. In fact, 
the authors’ starting point is the same, i.e. they intended in this way to outline the 
grounds for shifts in Keynesian thinking right at the beginning. 
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According to the study, the basis of Keynes’ conceptual framework is the assump-
tion of uncertainty. Keynes interprets certainty (rational belief) as something that 
does not only require complete confidence in the belief, but also the accuracy of 
the belief. In Keynes’s case, this certainty equates to knowledge. The authors de-
clare “Keynes is not as sceptical and agnostic as he is assumed to be. Keynes distin-
guished between two types of knowledge: the kind of knowledge that can be directly 
obtained and that which can only be obtained indirectly. One is the directly obtain-
able part of rational belief and the other is what we can deduce through argument”. 
One can agree with the authors’ statement that Keynes committed himself to the 
broader logic of conclusiveness rather than simple logical deduction and numeri-
cal probabilities. According to the study, Lawson’s opinion (1988) should be worth 
considering, who described Keynes’ attitude towards this as follows: “…through-
out his total contributions he is explicit that ... a priori thought is considered always 
to be open to constant modification and correction through continual interaction 
with experiences of the real world”. No doubt is left that probability statements, 
not being regarded as relative frequency, should be contingent on the current evi-
dence and knowledge, in line with Keynes’ expectations, but that changes in them 
should also be regarded as natural. 
1.2 Criticism of the classical probability concept
This chapter deals with the evolution of the classical probability concept and its 
applicability in economics. 
The authors agree that the main problem with studying the part played by prob-
ability is that there is no explicit and comprehensive definition of probability that 
could be applied universally to all branches of science. In their paper they em-
phasise that they do not deal with the axioms, postulations and paradigms of 
mathematical probability calculus, instead, they discuss the aspects of probability 
that are related to economic questions in general, and specifically to investment 
decisions. At the same time, they emphasise that based on the approach “prob-
ability may be objective, subjective and logical by nature, and based on the method 
it may be classical probability, relative frequency and propensity interpretation.” 
The authors underline the importance of the classical approach, which means 
that the probability of an event, in a given random trial, is the ratio between the 
equal-chance outcomes related to a given event and the number of equal-proba-
bility outcomes. It was, in fact, Laplace (1812) who fully described this by deriving 
probability from general determinism, as the authors of the paper note. 
The study reiterates that the great thinkers of probability articulated three essen-
tially identical principles argueing that probability originates from the limitations 
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of human knowledge. According to the “law of sufficient reason” the symmetry of 
outcomes presupposes identical probability for each outcome. The authors refer 
to the “law of insufficient reason” and express agreement with the ideas of Laplace 
and Bernoulli, who state “if we do not know which outcome is more likely, then we 
assign the same probability to each one” (Laplace, 1812; Bernoulli, 1713). The “prin-
ciple of indifference” states that equal probabilities must be assigned to each of 
several arguments if there is an absence of positive ground for assigning unequal 
ones”. In this regard, they present Keynes’ definition (1921): “The Principle of In-
difference asserts that if there is no known reason for predicating of our subject one 
rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the 
assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability”.
Following the analysis of the knowledge used and the correlations revealed, the 
authors jointly state that the classical concept of probability emerged as a formal-
ised theory in the second half of the 19th century as the theory of relative frequency. 
In their opinion, its main proponent was John Venn (1888/1962), who regarded the 
sequence and the limit as the cornerstones of his theory. Based on previous analy-
sis of the literature, we agree with that consistent statement. It should be noted 
however, that Venn created the framework on which the frequency interpretation 
could be based. The authors considered important to underline Venn’s definition 
for the concept of sequence. They call attention – correctly – that sequence is a 
chain of events, their linkage. 
An important observation of the study says, „by the end of the 19th century it 
had become clear that the classical interpretation of probability does not guaran-
tee the quantification of probability, and nor is it suitable for the probability rat-
ing of individual events and decisions in the absence of a series of events.” That is 
why it stimulated intellectual exploration and the development of new probability 
interpretations”4.
4 Weintraub (1975) concisely expressed the situation prevailing at the turn of the 19th and 20th 
centuries as follows: “At that time the only explicit theory which delineated the meaning of the 
proposition ‘the probability that x is y is p’ was that of Venn, which provided a relative frequency 
interpretation of probability statements. Such a theory asserted that the meaning o f ’the prob-
ability that x is y is p’ was that a large number of cases had been examined in which x was y and x 
was not y, and p was the proportion of the former in the total number of cases” (op. cit. 532).
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1.3 The Keynesian logical theory of probability
In this chapter the authors present the foundations of Keynes’ logical theory of 
probability and the difficulties of its implementation in practice. 
They state that „Keynes in his 1921 work based on logic and philosophy (TP) elabo-
rated a concept of probability that placed the roles of uncertainty, expectations and 
behaviour in economic decision making on a radically new footing.” 
The authors point out that Keynes’ 1937 work (GTE) included an explanation 
for his departure from the fundamental ideas of classical economics, by saying 
„…I sum up, therefore, the main grounds of my departure [from the traditional 
theory] as follows: The orthodox theory assumes that we have a knowledge of the 
future of a kind quite different from that which we actually possess. This false ra-
tionalism follows the lines of the Benthamite calculus. The hypothesis of a calcula-
ble future leads to a wrong interpretation of the principles of behaviour which the 
need for action compels us to adopt, and to an underestimation of the concealed 
factors of utter doubt, precariousness, hope and fear”.
In the study they interpret Keynes’ statement claiming that the classical (tradi-
tional) theory encompasses situations that are handled with the tools of probabil-
ity in keeping with the application of risk. The authors underline the emphasis of 
the classical theory and point out its core ideas, which assumes that a person can 
maximise the expected pay-out despite the fact that the likely values cannot be 
reliably calculated. 
They point out that Keynes „did not believe that entrepreneurs make a list of all the 
possible future outcomes, assign a probability to every item on the list, and then 
calculate the expected value. Keynes regarded the probability theory, like econom-
ics, to be a part of logic, and and at the beginning of his treatise he made it clear that 
his theory – in essence – was objective. For him, probability is the degree of rational 
belief and not simply the degree of belief.” 
It is also declared that in his 1921 work Keynes (TP) rejected the theory of relative 
frequency because „probability is not related to the balance of favourable and un-
favourable evidence, but to the balance of the absolute quantity of relevant knowl-
edge and that of relevant ignorance, in such a way that the discovery of new evi-
dence increases the weight of the argument.” In their analysis, the authors discuss 
O’Donnell’s important realisation, i.e. the TP was more logical than epistemic in 
character. Keynes’ TP is concerned with the path leading from the premises to the 
conclusion, that is conceivable but not certain. 
It is emphasised that one of the most disputed aspects of Keynes’ logical theory 
of probability is its objective or subjective nature. Rosser (2001) asserts that an 
important aspect of Keynes’s view on probability is that he himself considered 
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it to be essentially subjective; that is, something that can be constructed on the 
basis of internal logic rather than from mathematical calculations of the distribu-
tion of external observations. Hársing (1965) provides a convincing explanation 
to resolve this dilemma. The authors point out that in his analysis Keynes starts 
out from the fact that we can differentiate between objective phenomena that ex-
ist independently of human consciousness, which are customarily referred to as 
events in probability theory, and the subjective mirror-images of these that are 
created in our consciousness. 
It should be noted that the application of the mathematical probability calculus 
is based on the assumption that probabilities are measurable. In his core work, 
Keynes (1921) denied that all probabilities are numerically measurable or suitable 
for positioning on a standardised scale of sizes. 
Kay (2012) supports Skidelsky’s opinion, who believed that understanding Keynes’s 
approach to probability was the key to understanding the rest of his work. Keynes 
believed in the financial and business environment to be characterised by “radical 
uncertainty”. The only credible answer to the question of “what will interest rates 
be in twenty years’ time” is “we simply don’t know”5. 
Hársing (1971) emphatically points out that Keynes does not limit probability cal-
culation to the analysis of games of chance and insurance transactions, and even 
if it means partially relinquishing the quantitative aspect, he attempts to retain 
the original broadness of the concept of probability. (It should be noted that prob-
ability calculus, as a mathematical theory, emerged as a result of the work of B 
Pascal and Jakob Bernoulli in relation to the analysis of the outcomes of games 
of chance.)
The authors state that it is generally accepted that Keynes’s concept of logical 
probability is “of a comparative nature”. They believe “this necessarily follows 
from the effort to elaborate a logical theory of probability that was more exact 
than before, without narrowing the definition of probability”. Several analysts 
have emphasised that Keynes resisted excluding, from the theory, probabilities 
that did not lend themselves to quantitative evaluation.
The authors’ findings are correct inasmuch as „faced with the fact that after his TP 
of 1921, Keynes neither published any new work on logical probability nor took part 
in the continued development of the logical probability school of thought – initiated 
5 Kay (2012) believes that this was forward-looking and prescient commentary on the part of 
Keynes. Twenty years before publication of the TP we find ourselves in 1941, when Great Britain, 
at a critical stage of the Second World War, is engaged in a life-and-death struggle for survival. 
Keynes saw the future more clearly than most, but when it came to what specific events would 
take place, he simply did not know. Like everyone else.
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by him – we have to agree with Hársing’s (1971) conclusion that Keynes regarded 
the creation of his preferred version of logical probability as being important as a 
means of underpinning the results of his specialist (economics) research.”
To sum up, it can be said that Keynes pitted the complete future knowledge of 
classical economics against uncertainty.
1.4 The role of uncertainty in the Keynesian conceptual framework
In this chapter the authors seek to answer the question how close the relationship 
between Keynes’ theory of probability and that of economics is and whether one 
can demonstrate conceptual continuity between TP (1921) and GT (1936). To an-
swer it, they analysed the role of uncertainty in the Keynesian concept in detail. 
Uncertainty is a central category in Keynes’s (1921) seminal work on probability, 
in which he describes this concept and phenomenon as multidimensional. Un-
certainty features in this work with two independent definitions, with the two 
meanings deriving from the concepts of probability and weight. 
The authors have revealed that the thinkers of the literature of probability have 
commented on the question of uncertainty in Keynes’ concept differently and 
from different approaches. According to one opinion, uncertainty – in this sense 
– originates from a partial lack of relevant knowledge (O’Donnell). Another 
(Rosser, 2001) says Keynes’ conception of uncertainty developed paradoxically 
over time and one reason for this was that Keynes presented several different 
arguments relating to uncertainty, encapsulating certain shifts in his views, in-
creasingly emphasising that the chief characteristic of uncertainty is its unquan-
tifiable nature. 
The authors also point out that hogy Keynes’ 1937 article (GTE) gives the most 
complete explanation of uncertainty as he perceived it. They underline that 
Keynes deals with four versions of uncertainty in that article which means that 
he himself differentiated between the various degrees of uncertainty and did not 
consider fundamental uncertainty to be the only variant. The first group con-
sists of events that have unknown outcomes, and an ex ante probability rate (or 
distribution). These are the sources of “probability knowledge”. A paradigmatic 
example of this is gambling in a casino. For Keynes, the source of the probability 
rate is compatible with the frequency approach, as well as with the objective in-
terpretation of probability. 
The second version – unlike the previous one – means uncertain events where 
there is no “scientific basis” whatsoever for the probability rate. These are events 
that are beyond scientific knowledge, regarding which only unsubstantiated esti-
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mates can be made. According to Knight (1921), this is always the case when deal-
ing with decisions made under unique circumstances. 
As the third group, Keynes concedes that there are events which lie between the 
two extremes; as an example, he puts forward events that have no fixed ex ante 
probability rate, but are subjected to a credibly informed scientific analysis with 
a variable degree of certainty. The fourth is a version that is applied for practi-
cal reasons when uncertain events are treated as cases of probable knowledge 
although, from a theoretical perspective, such an act cannot be proven (cf. Back-
house-Bateman, 2006). 
In the authors’ interpretation, a comparison of the three seminal works gives 
an example of the changing substance of Keynesian uncertainty. In his GT of 
1936 Keynes discusses “low weight” uncertainty, in his GTE of 1937 of “irreduc-
ible uncertainty” and in his 1938 correspondence with Townshend of “unrankable 
uncertainty”. The first concept, “low weight uncertainty” appeared in Keynes’s 
(1936) work. By “very uncertain” Keynes does not mean “very improbable” 
(Keynes, 1936). 
The authors state that having such a wide variety of definitions of uncertainty, 
Koppl (1991) justifiably concludes that it is difficult to make a credible judgement 
based on uncertainty, especially given fundamental (radical) uncertainty, which 
Keynes emphasised in his (1921) and (1937) works in keeping with the weight of the 
argument. When knowledge is “uncertain”, people are not capable of estimating 
probability, or at least not credibly; and they cannot claim to have more knowl-
edge about the future. When knowledge is “uncertain”, it is not possible to obtain 
a good Benthamite calculation of future value, whether in the moral, hedonic 
or economic sense. If the uncertainty is sufficiently large, then we simply do not 
know (Keynes, 1937). When that variant of uncertainty is present, the rational ba-
sis of action significantly weakens. We need the “animal spirits” to hold economic 
actors back from freezing their operations. 
Most interpretations of uncertainty are epistemic, a good example of this – the 
authors advise - is Davidson’s (1982) opinion. According to him, there are many 
situations, in which we are faced with “true” uncertainty regarding the future 
consequences of today’s choices. In such cases, the decision-makers see that nei-
ther today’s expenditure on the analysis of past data nor the present market indi-
cators can be expected to offer reliable statistical or intuitive assistance in foretell-
ing the future. 
Recent decades have seen a growing recognition that uncertainty also has certain 
ontological aspects.. 
Further, the authors discuss Dunn’s opinion (2000), which says that „individu-
als are the builders of the future. In an uncertain world, the future – prior to its 
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formation – cannot be known, regardless of the calculation abilities attributed to 
individuals. It is not possible to know, ex ante, how any story will develop, and it 
matters not how much information and computing capacity a decision-maker has, 
the future can never be predicted ex ante with certainty (of probability)”. 
The authors lay special emphasis on the expectations the decisions rest on. These 
„expectations” are also dependent on imagination and intelligence, and on the 
narratives by which they are communicated; and they encapsulate feelings and 
emotions. In the study reference is made to Bronk’s opinion (2009), according to 
whom imagination and creativity are not merely the main causes of ontological 
uncertainty, they are also important tools for describing uncertainty... The future 
has no precise vision, since this will be determined subsequently with innova-
tions that have not yet been discovered and with decisions that have not yet been 
made, as well as the opportunities in this regard; market valuations only reflect 
our best views, the preferred narratives and the fleeting attitudes of optimism and 
pessimism.
1.5 Animal spirits, expectations, investment decisions
This chapter is an analysis of the consequences of uncertainty by discussing the 
„animal spirits”, the role of expectations and the investment decisions made un-
der uncertain conditions. 
The authors stress that animal spirits are a key category in Keynes’s (1936) semi-
nal work on economics. According to Koppl (1991), animal spirits come into the 
frame as a cause of action on the one hand, and as a subsequent source of instabil-
ity on the other. Keynes believes that most of our actions cannot derive from “a 
mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic”. He felt that 
“most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences 
of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result 
of animal spirits” (Keynes, 1936). He defined animal spirits as “a spontaneous urge 
to action rather than inaction”. 
Although Keynes saw the main thrust of the individual’s behaviour as an inten-
tion to maintain a rational economic face, he was also aware of the limitations on 
the attainability of such. 
The authors refer to Keynes’ statement, which says that lack of information and 
the general uncertainty of the future prevent entrepreneurs from forming scien-
tific or rational expectations; but if they need to act, they substitute this with con-
ventional expectations which then determine their investment decisions. How-
ever, precisely because this expectation is largely conventional, it is vulnerable 
to waves of optimism or pessimism, and the general state is the famous animal 
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spirits (Keynes, 1936). The authors of the paper emphasise that Keynes also warns 
that the actions inducted by the animal spirits are fundamentally irrational. He 
believed that rational action and probability are inseparable phenomena. Keynes 
took the view that rational actions must be based on rational belief. When people 
revert to the animal spirits, they are not acting on the basis of beliefs that are con-
sidered to be rational. Therefore, their actions are not rational. 
The authors underline that based on the foregoing, Koppl (1991) justifiably asks 
whether we need to take animal spirits seriously in economics. If we do, then is 
this not abandonment of an economic theory that is based on rationality? There 
is some evidence to suggest that “irrationalities” matter from time to time. Inves-
tor behaviour is sometimes justifiably labelled as “irrational”, because it can and 
does influence market processes. Koppl emphasises that there is no proof that 
people are irrational by nature. Rather, the signs show that it may be useful to 
take the animal spirits seriously, seeking those economic conditions under which 
the impulsive side of human nature counts, and those conditions under which it 
does not.
According to Keynes, „the lack of information, and general uncertainty regarding 
the future, make it impossible for the decision-makers to form rational expecta-
tions, and this fact is pivotal with respect to their investment decisions. On this 
basis, Keynes does not conclude that every single actor forms his or her individual 
expectations that differ from those of all the other actors. 
Rosser (2001) views the Keynesian perception of uncertainty as a fundamental 
and unquantifiable phenomenon to be the basis for why the “bird on the wing” of 
real capital investment is directed not by long-term rational expectations, which 
would not even be possible, but is driven by the essentially subjective and ulti-
mately “irrational” animal spirits, a spontaneous urge to action in the face of 
uncertainty. Hodgson (1985) confirms that irrational decision-making stems not 
from human nature, but from the circumstances surrounding the decision and 
action.
1.6 Role of expectations
The authors emphasise that Keynes makes a sharp distinction between short-
term and long-term expectations. From these definitions, Keynes concluded 
that a company’s daily output depends on its short-term expectations, whereas 
its investment in new capital is a function of long-term expectations. Short term 
expectations greatly differ from long term expectations that entrepreneurs hope 
to achieve in some form of future profit. Butos–Koppl (1995) also analysed that 
correlation several times. 
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Keynes’s theory of long-term expectations is based on his rationalism, and states 
that there is very little correspondence between expectations and the economic 
events. According to Butos–Koppl (1995), Keynes believed that economic expecta-
tions are subjective. However, the subjectivity of the expectations has more pro-
nounced consequences in the case of long-term expectations than in the case of 
short-term expectations. Keynes (1936) in his core work on economics – in rela-
tion to long term expectations – discussed the future knowledge one would need 
to make the right decisions to support/boost capital projects. The paper calls at-
tention to the correlation also emphasised by Keynes that, since a certain knowl-
edge of the future cannot be attained, the decisions on capital projects, due to 
their nature, must be founded on the belief of cognition, which is in fact flimsy. 
While short-term expectations are closely associated with the realised values, 
long-term expectations are not formed by a rational calculation, because they do 
not “rest on an adequate or secure foundation” (Keynes, 1937). All this leads us to 
conclude – the authors advise - that, in his view, long-term expectations cannot 
establish a systematic relationship with fundamental economic reality. Butos–
Koppl (1995) perceptively concludes that, for Keynes, expectations regarding the 
future are states of belief. 
Coddington (1982) believes that Keynes, in the context of the GT, presents uncer-
tainty as an inherent part of investment decisions. This is the reason for Keynes’s 
assertion that the foundation of knowledge for investments in the private sector 
is flimsy.
1.7 Investment decisions
They are based on beliefs regarding future circumstances which, however, have to 
be based on the conditions of the present and past. Accordingly, investment be-
haviour may show capricious fluctuations either as the present conditions change 
unpredictably, leading to irregular fluctuation with regard to anticipated future 
conditions, or through changes in the beliefs forming the basis for the decisions, 
without any corresponding changes in the actual conditions. Of these two sce-
narios, it is the second that leads to autonomous volatility in the aggregated ex-
penditure arising from investment decisions. 
In keeping with this, Coddington (1982) maintains that if changes in private in-
vestment are rooted in the spontaneous and capricious functioning of the hu-
man mind, then there is a solution to Keynes’s problem: such a cataloguing would 
provide the reason why this type of expenses fluctuates autonomously instead of 
responding to changes in objective circumstances. This is the way in which sub-
jectivist ideas show themselves in Keynes’s GT.
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The authors deem it important to emphasise that, from the perspective of the 
Keynesian argument, it is not really the fact of uncertainty that is important, but 
rather how individuals are likely to react to the fact of the uncertainty. Accord-
ingly, if investment decisions are shrouded in great uncertainty, manufacturers 
respond to this for as long as possible by making the same investment decisions 
during this period as they did in the previous one (because the results of the pre-
vious decisions are what the decision-makers know something about). 
In line with the correlations revealed so far, the authors are in agreement with 
Weintraub’s (1975) conclusion, that Keynes made a breakthrough in economics 
with his GT, specifically by making the relationship between uncertainty and in-
vestment explicit; and the theoretical core of this relationship was already present 
in the TP. Another aspect of this theoretical innovation was that Keynes moved 
beyond the games of chance and applied the language of probability to real deci-
sion-making situations. When evaluating alternative courses of action, individu-
als are driven by their views regarding the most probable outcome. The outcomes 
are manifest in the future; but they cannot be observed in the present. 
The authors specifically underline that Keynes treated as fact the phenomena 
whereby 1) capital assets are long-lasting, 2) the desire to hoard money reflects 
the degree of our mistrust of the future, and 3) production needs time. These are 
all facts associated with a world in which time is of importance. The authors here 
reiterate, “In the course of our previous reasoning it became clear that time and 
uncertainty are intertwined; the former inevitably attracts the latter”. 
Weintraub concludes that Keynes’s system was dynamic in the traditional sense 
that it includes time as a material factor; thus, if investments are volatile due to 
uncertainty, there is no level of output or employment that can always be main-
tained. That is why Weintraub calls uncertainty an equilibrium phenomenon and 
can declare that Keynes was concerned with equilibrium problems. The animal 
spirits urge people to socially useful action driving investment. 
Keynes believed the emergence of the Stock Exchange brought about a change. He 
wrote, “with the separation between ownership and management which prevails 
to-day and with the development of organised investment markets, a new fac-
tor of great importance has entered in, which sometimes facilitates investment 
but sometimes adds greatly to the instability of the system”. The new factor was 
speculation. 
Although long-term expectations remain constant for a long time, they are nev-
ertheless exposed to sudden and violent changes that may at times be caused by 
(sometimes irrational) speculation, although they can also be triggered by psy-
chological changes. Keynes – as the authors have shown above – presents his own 
theory in the form of “animal spirits”. He claims that these are the forces behind 
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capital investments: “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not ... 
the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantita-
tive probabilities”. 
1.8  Continuity or discontinuity in the role of probability  
in the Keynesian conceptual framework
In this chapter the authors focus attention on discussing whether continuity or 
discontinuity prevailed in the Keynesian conceptual framework over time. 
The authors reiterate in the paper that sharp differences of opinion have emerged 
for decades as to how Keynes’ GT is related to the theoretical concept of his main 
work on probability TP. Gillies (1988) believes that at first consideration the link 
may be weak, since Keynes identified probability with the degree of rational belief 
in his TP. 
The authors write that following Keynes’ TP in 1921 there were sharp differences 
of opinion as to „there was continuity or a break of continuity”. On one side, there 
was the opinion that Keynes – mainly influenced by Ramsey’s criticism – made 
a shift from logical probability to a subjective probability approach (Bateman, 
1987). On the other side the prevailing opinion was that Keynes did not adapt any 
of the alternative methods of probability at variance from logical probability but 
that he continued his work under the original framework conditions of the TP. 
That view is represented most decidedly by O’Donnell (1990). 
There is a marked difference between Keynes’ (1921) and Ramsey’s (1931) concept 
of probability, which has been influencing the debate on the topic to date. Ramsey 
was the first to describe the applicability of a subjective feeling as a means of inter-
pretation. He looked upon this approach as being complementary to the frequency 
interpretation of probability, which was an established theory at that time. Ramsey 
emphasised the measurability of the probability relationship. He believed it was 
possible to arrive at probability values with a behavioural experiment; that is, he 
viewed reliance on the betting process as an aid for determining belief.
The main thrust of Ramsey’s criticism was that the version of the probability rela-
tion discussed by Keyes simply does not exist, and Ramsey’s own procedure (bet-
ting) makes it much easier to find the “degrees of belief” held by people.
The authors also state – on the basis of Keynes’ response to Ramsey’s criticism 
(1933) – that Keynes was willing to acknowledge Ramsey’s opinion on several 
points; it is clear at the same time the two of them did not agree in everything. 
Speaking on Keynes’ changing views of probability, Bateman (1987) comments 
Keynes adopted a subjective interpretation of probability. 
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As regards the question of continuity or discontinuity, the authors regard 
O’Donnell’s view on this as definitive. He made two assertions: firstly, Keynes’s 
thinking continued to be based on the framework assumptions of the TP; secondly, 
there was an internal shift within the constraints of these assumptions after 1931, 
whereby the importance of the indeterminate domain and the weight of weak 
rationality increased, while the significance of the determinate domain and the 
strong rationality decreased.
Gillies (1988) also poses the question of whether Keynes’s view on probability 
changed over the years. He concludes that Ramsey’s criticism of Keynes’s views 
moved Keynes into an intermediate position between his original logical inter-
pretation of probability and Ramsey’s subjective probability theory. Gillies de-
fines Keynes’s new theoretical position as constructing a so-called intersubjective 
probability theory, making use of Keynes’ views on the long-term expectations of 
entrepreneurs. 
Based on the foregoing, we can state that Keynes was closer to the intersubjective 
epistemic theory than the subjective epistemic theory championed by Ramsey. 
Lawson (1985) rightfully concludes that intersubjective probability was closer to 
Keynes’s earlier thinking, and that intersubjective probability occupies an inter-
mediate position between rational belief (early Keynesian thinking) and subjec-
tive belief (Ramsey). 
Gillies (1998) also points out that Keynes still did not capitulate to Ramsey, and 
he had doubts as to whether Ramsey provided a satisfactory explanation for the 
differentiation between the degrees of belief and the degrees of rational believe. 
Instead, the authors, moving beyond the dichotomy of continuity versus discon-
tinuity, examine the evolutionary process in which items that were present in the 
TP, but later evolved in Keynes’s subsequent works, were adapted specifically for 
economics; namely, the applicability of the atomic hypothesis in the moral; that 
is, the social sciences.
Hamouda–Smithin (1988) points out that the above quotes contain no reference 
to economic or social sciences. In other parts of the TP, Keynes expresses the 
opinion that a clear distinction must be made between the natural sciences and 
the moral or social sciences; and while the atomic hypothesis may have a role in 
the former at any time, it is categorically inappropriate in the latter.
Towards the end of the 1930s, Keynes returned to the atomic-organic dilemma 
that resulted from the process of change that occurred in Keynes’s conception of 
uncertainty between the mid-1920s and the end of the 1930s. During this period, 
Keynes’s views on uncertainty were “radicalised”; the role of indeterminateness 
and the fundamental grew. 
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Based on the above quotations by the authors, Keynes clearly puts forward the 
view that the atomic hypothesis does not apply to the world of social relations. 
The elements of this world do not function as “legal” atoms, striving to exert their 
own independent effect under all circumstances, but yield willingly to various 
laws in all the alternative configurations of the system. On this basis, Keynes’s 
view on uncertainty can only be understood in relation to his vision of the social 
process.
1.9 Competing interpretations of probability in the twentieth century
The authors present the interpretations of probability embodied, on the one hand, 
in a newly worded version of the theory of relative frequency and, on the other 
hand, emerging through the development of the theory of logical probability ex-
ternal to a paradigm of economics. 
In the authors’ opinion, the classical probability theory– from the late 19th century 
– came in for criticism due to the non-fulfilment of the principle of indifference 
and the principle of additivity, and the narrow scope for application of the theory. 
In fact, the narrow scope of the practical applicability of the theory limited its 
practical effects. They state that the most forceful challenge to the classical inter-
pretation of probability came from Keynes’s seminal work on probability, laying 
the foundations for the system of logical probability. 
Of the theories presented in the study, the following are to be underlined – the 
authors of the study also refer to them – as they have laid the foundation for their 
ideas. 
Paradoxically, the challenging view that had the greatest impact was the “rela-
tive frequency” interpretation of probability put forward by Richard von Mises 
(1928) and Reichenbach (1961). In this theory, probabilities are associated not with 
individual results but with event types, and the theory itself takes an objective 
approach. 
The basis of Richard von Mises’s probability theory is the concept of the collective. 
The rational concept of probability, in contrast to probability as used in every-
day conversation, only receives a precise meaning if the collective to which it is 
applied is precisely defined in every case. The collective essentially consists of a 
series of observations that continue for an indefinite period. Every observation 
ends with the recording of a certain property. The relative frequency with which 
a specified property occurs has a limiting value in the series of observations. This 
interpretation has been compared with several authors’ opinion and works (Hau-
we, 2011; Hársing, 1965; Reichenbach, 1961; and Carnap, 1950).
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According to Hauwe (2011), Richard von Mises regarded the frequency approach 
to probability theory as a science of the same order as geometry or theoretical me-
chanics, because he believed that probability should be based on facts and not on 
a lack of them. The frequency theory links probability with the real world through 
the observed objective facts (or data), with special regard to the recurring facts. 
According to Hársing (1965), Richard von Mises views relative frequency (statisti-
cal probability) as the exclusive form of probability. He defines probability as the 
limiting value of relative frequency obtained through the infinite repetition of a 
trial. He excludes the problem of moral decisions from the field of probability. In 
his opinion, the concept of probability is only applicable in the following three 
areas: games of chance, insurance transactions and mechanical and physical phe-
nomena. The most importance circumstance is that Richard von Mises rejects the 
concept of logical probability on the basis that it is subjective in nature (Richard 
von Mises, 1928). 
In his critique, Hauwe (2011) also mentions that probability in economics is not 
a manifestation of physical entities as Richard von Mises supposes when con-
structing his theory. The empirical underpinnings of probability are missing in 
the economic sense, for example with respect to objective frequency probability. 
The main flaw in this theory – the authors believe - is that it is too narrow, as 
probability is used in many important situations; but among these there are none 
in which the empirical collective can be defined in an economic context. The defi-
nition is too narrow for application in economics. They also identify mismatches 
between the theories of Richard von Mises and Keynes. For Richard von Mises, 
probability is part of empirical science; for Keynes, on the other hand, it is an 
extension of deductive logic. Richard von Mises defines probability as frequency 
with limiting values, and Keynes as a degree of rational belief. For Richard von 
Mises the probability axioms are derivable from two empirical laws by abstrac-
tion, while for Keynes they can be obtained through direct logical intuition. 
The authors present a combined assessment of Hársing’s (1965) evaluation of 
Richard von Mises’s theory, which confirms the authors’ supposition that this 
theory – in essence – is a redefinition of the 19th-century frequentist conception of 
probability. According to Richard von Mises, probability calculus is the theory of 
recurring cases of certain pseudo-random or random events or series of events, 
like the rolling of dice. These series are defined by two axiomatic conditions as 
a “pseudorandom” or random series: one of these is the convergence axiom (or 
boundary axiom), and the other is the axiom of randomness. 
The authors have come to the conclusion that the two axioms used by Richard von 
Mises to define the “collective” have come in for strong criticism, which Hársing 
believes is not entirely unjustified. The linking of the convergence axiom and the 
randomness axiom, in particular, were criticised on the basis that it is not permis-
Zoltán Zéman190
sible to apply the concept of the mathematical threshold value or convergence to 
a series which – by definition (viz. due to the randomness axiom) – cannot be 
subordinated to any kind of rule. 
Attention is called to the fact that Reichenbach (1961) only recognises statisti-
cal probability, which – in his conception – is the limiting value of the relative 
frequency of random events. Accordingly, he believes that one-off events have no 
probability. Despite the fact that he ultimately only recognises statistical prob-
ability, Reichenbach also discusses logical probability. He believes, however, that 
logical probability is secondary in nature and can be traced back to statistical 
probability. Reichenbach regards the statistical approach of Richard von Mises to 
be the only possible interpretation. Thus, ultimately, Reichenbach’s logical prob-
ability is nothing other than the logical interpretation of Richard von Mises’s ap-
proach: the logic of statement sequences. 
According to the authors (Bélyácz–Daubner, 2020), it should be noted with re-
spect to the interpretation of the above that, following the publication of the TP, 
Keynes did not concern himself at all with the theoretical problems of probabil-
ity; nevertheless, the issue of probability did reappear – albeit indirectly – in the 
GT, in connection with the formation of expectations. It should also be noted 
that Keynes did not participate in the scholarly efforts that came after the break-
through in logical probability that he initiated. The following extracts from the 
authors of the paper should be underlined: 
„According to Carnap (1950) there is not one, but two concepts of probability; one 
is empirical, the other logical in nature, and both are objective. He considered the 
logical interpretation of probability to be one of several possible definitions rather 
than the only permissible one. In Carnap’s view, one of the probability concepts 
is “probability 1”, which describes the relationship between statements (specifically 
the degree by which a statement logically strengthens other statements); the other 
concept is “probability 2”, which relates to the relationship between classes of events. 
Amsterdamski (1965) highlights that, for Carnap, probability is the degree of confir-
mation of statements, while for Jeffrey (1939, 1954) it is the degree of rational belief. 
According to Amsterdamski, Carnap considers “degrees of rational belief” to be a 
bad term, because in Carnap’s view the substance of Keynes’s and Jeffreys’s theory 
is that probability is nothing other than the degree by which a statement reinforces 
other statements; in other words, we are talking about logical probability. 
Neither Jeffreys nor Keynes recognise the existence of the two probability concepts, 
so as far as they are concerned the probability statements were never about what 
kind of events are probable; they only ever talk about which statements receive the 
most robust confirmation from the information available to the subject. Carnap 
identifies the concept of rational belief – from Keynes’s and Jeffreys’s theory – with 
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the principle of his “degree of confirmation” and identifies the whole conception 
with logical interpretation.
Carnap defines the degree of confirmation in a semantic system. In this, a numeri-
cal value is assignable to every statement. If we know, for example, the numerical 
value assigned to statements k and a, the P(a/k) value can be defined; that is, the 
extent to which k confirms a (Carnap–Stegmüller, 1954). 
Pólya (1949) applies the premises of abstract probability calculus in a comparative 
sense, for investigation of so-called plausible conclusions. Pólya – like Carnap – rec-
ognises the legitimacy of the two interpretations of probability, but just like Keynes 
he regards logical probability as the degree of rational belief. He, however, categori-
cally rejects the quantitative interpretability of logical probability. 
Gillies (1988) takes propensity theory to be any approach that assumes objective 
probability but is not a relative frequency-based interpretation. Popper’s (1934) 
aim in creating propensity theory was to also be capable of assigning an objective 
probability to singular events6. Gillies criticises this view that objective probability 
can also be attributed to singular events; if we can find a narrowest reference class 
through which the probability of the singular event can be determined as the rela-
tive frequency of similar types of event in the given class.”
1.10 The impact of probability theory on Keynes’ economic thinking
In this chapter the authors reiterate their opinion that „in itself, the fact that in 
the analysis of long-term expectations set out in the GT we were able to refer, on 
several strands of enquiry, to the Keynes’s probability concepts and arguments 
found in his TP, shows that these probability labels could have been the roots of 
his ideas relating to expectations”. 
The authors agree that the premise that Keynes’s thoughts on probability served 
as the basis for his theory of economic expectations is an accepted proposition 
among post-Keynesian thinkers. They support their opinion in the paper with 
quotes mainly from the works of O’ Donnell, Skidelsky, Brady and Ramsey. The 
following extracts relating to Keynes are worth special attention. 
They underline the reasoning of O’Donnell (1990), that Keynes’s (1921) TP is the 
appropriate starting point for understanding how the GT addresses uncertainty, 
expectations and behaviour. O’Donnell believes that we cannot find a precise par-
6 Hársing (1971a) believes that the physical motivation for this effort was quantum mechanics. 
Popper (1997) – in his early theory – takes a set of initial generating conditions and regards them 
as having a certain tendency – a propensity – to “generate” the observed frequency.
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allel; what we do find, however, is an intermediate parallelism: one factor is the 
transition from the philosophical to the economic plane, while the other is the 
shift towards non-determinedness within the constraints of Keynesian philoso-
phy. O’Donnell also emphasises that Keynes (1921), in his work on probability, re-
garded it as a fundamental principle that philosophy and methodology perform a 
controlling function in economic argument. They call attention that it is in sharp 
contrast to the dominant role of expectations; probabilities have a subordinated 
role in the GT. Expectations rather than probabilities are the general concept of 
behaviour. Keynes’ GT is primarily supported by induction and his inductive 
approach consists of two parts: the first is the projection of knowledge into the 
future; the second is a modification of the extrapolation in line with specific an-
ticipated expectations. O’ Donnell believes the second component is the really 
important one, since Keynes recognised that extrapolation demanded by rational 
behaviour must be changed if there are grounds for believing that the future will 
differ from the past. 
The authors pay special attention to Keynes’ comment to the effect that prob-
abilities must be made contingent on current uncertainties and knowledge, with-
out regarding probabilities as relative frequency, since this will change after it has 
emerged. Moreover, Keynes’s focus on the fundamentally qualitative nature of 
reality suggests that both informal argument and intuitive judgement are neces-
sary for economic reasoning. 
They make it clear that the concept of rational belief has a key role in Keynes’s 
works on probability and economics. He saw two paths to the attainment of ra-
tional belief regarding future prospects if perfect knowledge was not available. 
The first is based on the formation of probability, which can be arrived at either 
through uncertain information or a “doubtful argument”. (1921) In the second 
case, it is impossible to define rational belief. In this event, actions are determined 
by the animal spirits. These are precisely the two types of uncertainty that clas-
sical theory rules out with the assumption that individuals have full or certain 
knowledge of what Keynes calls the “primary proposition” that a person sets out 
to validate.
The authors state that until the middle of the 20th century, the thinkers of eco-
nomics concerned with uncertainty, risk and probability had deliberately em-
braced complexity, and used probability to represent it. The peak of this thought 
process was Keynes’s TP of 1921, GT of 1936 and GTE of 1937; in these, probability 
and uncertainty appear as qualitative properties of decision-making, a mode of 
thinking suitable for covering economics as completely as possible. 
Following this – especially with the redefinition of the frequency theory of prob-
ability – the principles of measurability and quantifiability became dominant, 
and complexity was expressed with probability distributions, expected values and 
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standard deviation as compressed values. Through this, the range of analytical 
possibilities was expanded but the complexity disappeared from the approaches. 
This process can also be described as the avoidance of complexity. 
According to the authors, an important question is why both acceptance and re-
jection of probability took place at the same time in the mainstream of economics. 
They emphasise the rise of formalisation in economics, which may have contrib-
uted to the decline of the uncertainty concept. They also advise that probability lost 
ground due to the joint impact of several economic factors. That is why economic 
theories have reduced probability to risk in calculable form.
2 SUMMARY
In my opinion, the study is gap filling in addition to being of interest for a limited 
group of scholars. The topic selected is exceptional, its elaboration is extensive 
and it is based on a wide range of knowledge. It is well structured: by building 
the chapters one on another, the authors help the reader reach their conclusion, 
which may require a more specific interpretation regarding the question posed in 
the subtitle. 
The authors discuss the evolution of the different versions of logical probability 
outside of economic thinking. One of their major findings is that – following 
the publication of TP – Keynes rested the problems of the theory of probability. 
On the other hand, the authors state Keynes could not completely part with the 
thread, since his ideas on it resurfaced in GT. The authors also point out that 
Keynes was not committed to the scholarly issues that induced the changes in 
economics he had introduced. Regarding the evolution of the versions of logi-
cal probability, they discuss the thought realm of Carnap (1950), Amsterdamski 
(1965), Pólya (1949), Hársing (1965,1971), Gillies (1988) and Popper (1934) and their 
correlations to the Keynesian philosophy of economics underlining Keynes’ re-
alisation (1921) noting „any additional knowledge we may possess has an even 
greater role than our statistical knowledge.” 
In the second part of the paper the authors analyse the impact of the theory of 
probability on Keynes’ economic thinking and point out that Keynes – talking 
about knowledge and being informed – „means true satements whether or not 
they are direct or indirect knowledge”. They also argue that Ramsei’s (1931) state-
ment regarding Keynes was key, as he confirmed rational belief in the context 
of certain knowledge alone. The authors reviewed and collided several concepts 
– O’Donell (1990), Lawson (1988), Brady (1983), Skildesky (2011), Lucas (1977) – to 
come to relevant conclusions and to reveal correlations. As their final conclusion, 
they emphasise that answering these questions caused a dilemma in economics. 
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Based on the findings of the last chapter – “The impact of probability on Keynes’ 
economic thinking” – the question of the final implicit conclusion is raised again. 
Which question is answered in the authors’ study? Do they answer if Keynes’ 
theory of logical probability had an impact on economic thinking in general or if 
Keynes’ theory of logical probability had an impact on his own economic think-
ing? It can be said that the processing of a generous amount of literature support-
ed the dilemma of economics with regard to accepting or rejecting uncertainty or 
whether other assessments can be formalised. 
The authors come to the conclusion that the great thinkers’ different views on 
probability suggest the multiplication of the concept of probability. They also 
point out that is why competing concepts appeared in the 20th century as chal-
lengers. They state that this competition did not have a major impact on most 
thinkers of economics, they stayed with the analysis of „objective” and „subjec-
tive” without clearly explaining their content. As their final conclusion, they put 
forward the following statement: „economics could only manage uncertainty - em-
phasising testing and extrapolation – by reducing it to a calculable form as risk.” 
To sum up, the theories, trends and analyses reviewed in the study lead to the 
final conclusion to say that Keynes’ theory of logical probability had an impact on 
his own economic thinking and also affected the economic thinking of his age, 
the next age and even of our days.
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